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1 
Tales of reconciliation and eventual peace shine through our global history, 
glimmering examples that are often overshadowed by international focus on protracted, 
violent, existential conflicts.  The conflict in Israel-Palestine is conventionally defined as 
such1.  Often, this conflict between the residents of the area of land between the Jordan 
River and the Mediterranean Sea is considered unsolvable, irreconcilable. Typical 
sentiment portrays Palestinians and Israelis as existing within a centuries-old, never 
ending cycle of irrational violence.  Palestinian Jews, Muslims and Christians lived 
peacefully under Ottoman rule; only recently did a distinct trend of exclusiveness 
develop and become interwoven in the social, political and cultural fabric of both 
societies.  While there are many overarching international economic, political, cultural, 
and religious influences on the current situation of the conflict, this paper focuses on 
nationalism and its influence on identity and conflict. 
Since the rise of Zionism as a force of Jewish nationalism in the historic land of 
Israel and the concurrent expansion of Palestinian nationalism, the people who 
identified with the nationalities formed and strengthened identities based on shared 
history, language, and culture.  One significant focus found in both Palestinian and 
Israeli identities is the concept of the homeland.  For Israelis, the homeland, epitomized 
in the commonly used phrase Ha Aretz (literally the land, but used as an equivalent to 
the State of Israel), is perceived as a land rooted in historical and religious 
                                                
1 Bar-Tal, Daniel, Why Does Fear Override Home in societies Engulfed by Intractable Conflict, as it does in the 
Israeli Society? Political Psychology 22.3 (2001), 601-627.  
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significance, a place of refuge and national revival.  For Palestinians, the homeland is a 
historical and religious space, yearned for but unattainable.  Physical connection to the 
land is a core cultural belief based on the agricultural past and urban centers of 
Palestinian society.  A narrative of remembrance, indigenous continuity, survival and 
return to the land defines their national struggle.  
The most concrete aspect of the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians is the 
physical land.  The battle over territory began even before Israel was declared a state 
with the arrival of Zionist Jewish settlers, the end of the British Mandate, and the UN 
Partition Plan of 1947.   Since this time, both Zionism and Palestinian nationalisms have 
altered their collective definitions of national boundaries2.  A many adherents to 
Zionism believe the Land of Israel spans from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan 
River, while many accept more constrained borders, such as without Israeli control of 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip. For many Palestinians, the homeland is also conceived as 
the entire territory between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea.  Like Israelis, 
many Palestinians have accepted that the future borders of a Palestinian state may be 
limited to areas of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.  It is apparent that a distinction 
between political boundaries and conceptions of a homeland exist.  It is also clear that 
                                                
2 Falah, Ghazi and David Newman, The Spatial Manifestation of Threat: Israelis and Palestinians Seek a Good 
Border, Political Geography 12.8 (1995), 689-706, 12 Sept. 2007. 
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within the context of national-group desires and political aspirations, the definition of 
homeland boundaries overlap3.   
It is within the context of political-state borders and national-homeland 
construction that the conflict of exclusion arises.  Both Palestinians and Israelis have 
denied the legitimacy of the others ties to the land while asserting their rightful 
ownership and expanding collective identities that promote this notion.  The 
foundation of denying the other from the land, whether from the conception of 
homeland or from the actual state, is where the zero-sum4 nature of the conflict is 
derived5.  In this way, the identities attached to the same land have continuously 
affirmed and institutionalized the exclusion of the other by perceiving the other as 
a threat to their connection to the land.  
 It is this element of exclusiveness that has aided the continuation of hostility 
between Israelis and Palestinians.  This and other aspects of the conflictsuch as issues 
of limited resources, displaced persons, sovereignty, and powerevidence the 
necessity of conflict resolution and reconciliation.  Current political trends 
overwhelmingly favor what is called the two-state solution.  This solution is based on 
the premise that Palestinians and Israelis are unwilling or unable to coexist on the same 
                                                
3 Yiftachel, Oren. Territory as the Kernel of the Nation: Space, Time and Nationalism in Israel/Palestine. 
Geopolitics 7.2 (2002), 215-248, 13 Sept. 2007. 
 
4 Kelman, Herbert C. The Interdependence of Israeli and Palestinian National Identities: The Role of the Other in 
Existential Conflicts. Journal of Social Issues 55.3 (1999), 581-600. 19 July 2007.  
5 Newman, David and Ghazi Falah, Bridging the Gap: Palestinian and Israeli Discourses on Autonomy and 
Statehood, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series, 22.1 (1997). 16 Sept. 2007.  
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piece of land.  It also presupposes the notion that both groups are prepared to reduce 
their concept of homeland in favor of a political state.  This solution is one that 
focuses on conflict resolutionthat is, the process used to ensure that conflicts between 
opposing parties are resolved peacefully6.  However, in ignoring an essential aspect of 
both Israeli and Palestinian national identities, the concept of homeland, the potential of 
the two-state solution is weakened.   
By recognizing the significance of the concept of homeland and the politics of 
exclusion that have developed between the Palestinians and Israelis, it is apparent that 
components of identity that serve to continue the conflict must be reevaluated.   Identity 
transcendence is one means of conflict reconciliation that recognizes the power of 
identity.   The development of a transcendent identity that encompasses both Israelis 
and Palestinians is a necessary condition for effective cooperation, long-term peaceful 
coexistence, and ultimate reconciliation between the two people7.  A redefinition of the 
homeland can encourage this process of reconciliation.  
Throughout this paper, the term Israeli implies the people that identify as a 
member of the Zionist-Israeli community within or outside of the state of Israel.  This 
does not include citizens of Israel who identify as Palestinian or non- Zionist.  The term 
Palestinian is understood as the people who identify as a member of the Palestinian 
                                                
6 Bar-Tal, Daniel and Gemma H Bennink, Nature of Reconciliation as an Outcome and as a Process, In Y Bar- 
    Simon-Tov, Ed. From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004, 11-38.  
7 Kelman, Herbert C. The Interdependence of Israeli and Palestinian National Identities: The Role of the Other in 
Existential Conflicts. Journal of Social Issues 55.3 (1999), 19 July 2007, 586. 
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national community, including those who do not live within the West Bank or Gaza 
Strip. 
This paper will review important concepts of national collective identity 
formation and nationalism in Israel/Palestine, focusing on the construction of the 
homeland.  It will then analyze Palestinian and Israeli national narratives and 
construction of attachment to the land. Using this as a basis, I will consider how the 
definition of a territorial homeland supports exclusion, and suggest that exclusion of 
the other is unnecessary.  A redefinition of the concept of homeland is then discussed 
as a means of moving past elements that support the continuation of the conflict. 
Homeland Nationalism 
 Of the differences between Israelis and Palestinians, the most critical struggle is 
the claim for the same geo-political land.  For many Palestinians and Israelis, 
nationalism is not just a fluttering flag or a national anthem sung during special 
occasions.  Rather, it is a central concept that informs personal and collective identities 
and the shape of society itself.  Benedict Anderson, often cited as a primary source for 
defining the nation from a political science perspective, states that a nation is an 
imagined political community8.  He further details that these communities form their 
group identity through means of linguistics, literature, culture, and territory.  This 
action of developing the nation, nationalism, can be defined as a constant process of 
                                                
8 Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. New York: 
Verso, 1993, 6.  
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building collective imaginations about the commonality of the nation9.  Therefore, 
nationalism is a method of developing the collective identity of a group of people who 
define themselves as a nation.  Conscious membership, intentional development and 
the social construction of a nation often, and particularly in the case of Israel/Palestine, 
leads to exclusion of the others national claims.  
Maintaining group membership that promotes exclusion can result in efforts 
encouraging the belief of one groups legitimacy over the other.  It is typically a goal 
of nationalism to establish that the nation has always existed, and through the use of 
symbols, memories, myths, heritage, the attempt is to trace the (constructed) genealogy 
of an identity group back to a specific place, time, and ancestor in order to derive an 
ideological lineage10.  Israeli and Palestinian nationalisms have developed deep-rooted 
ties to the territory of Israel/Palestine as an essential component of their national 
narrative through methods of history, collective past, religion and political ideology.  In 
a study of space and nationalism, Oren Yiftachel states that Palestinians and Israelis 
place great importance in grounding their national identity and claim in a specific 
location, which embodies their histories, memories, cultures, religions and desired 
futures11.  The attachment to the historic land of Palestine/Israel as a component of 
identity is part of a constructed process, used to strengthen national ties and instill a 
                                                
9 Yiftachel, 219. 
10 Kinnvall, Catarina. Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity and the Search for Ontological 
Security. Political Psychology 25.5 (2004), 10 June 2007, 756. 
11 Yiftachel 216. 
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sense of belonging for a community that is expected to remain loyal to the nation12.  
These ties to the land and past of the nation are made concrete by the formation of 
official borders and control of the land13.  Another result is the development of the 
concept of homeland by both Israelis and Palestinians.    
In a study of existential dimensions of security, Kinnvall reveals an interesting 
definition of home, which can be applied similarly to the concept of homeland.  She 
states that home is a foundation for identity construction, and has the ability to link 
together a material environment with a deeply emotional set of meanings relating to 
permanence and continuity14.  A homeland is seen as a basis for strengthening the 
nation by supporting elements that create the national community.  The homeland, 
while grounded in physical territory, has an essential emotional dimension that allows 
the nation to promote sentiments such as a sense of belonging, memory of space, 
feelings of historical continuity and possession of the land.  Newman (2001), in a study 
of national territorial identities states:  
The homeland is a territory within which the historical evolution of the 
group took place, within which place and space take on supernatural 
                                                
12 Newman, David. From National to Post-National Territorial Identities in Israel-Palestine. GeoJournal 53 
(2001), 6 Sept. 2007, 238.  
13 Newman, David. Real Spaces, Symbolic Spaces: Interrelated Notions of Territory in the Arab-Israeli Conflict. 
A Road Map to War: Territorial Dimensions of International Conflict. Ed. Paul F. Diehl. Nashville: Vanderbilt 
University Press, 1999, 4. 
14 Kinnvall 747. 
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dimensions and whose territory is perceived as being more important 
than the territory of the Other15. 
Palestinian and Israelis have claimed the territory of Palestine/Israel, using emotional 
and political means.  When a territory is caught between competing national narratives, 
such as in Israel/Palestine, each group strives to establish a primary claim through 
methods of historical and religious narratives, political control, and social exclusion.  
The aim is to prove legitimacy by asserting the national groups exclusive right and 
historical legacy to the land16.  Using nationalism as a tool, Israeli and Palestinian 
collective communities have developed a similar ethos that emphasizes connection to a 
historic homeland and exclusive possession of this land.  
The development of a national community is often used as a basis for exclusion 
of the other.  Boundaries between the inside community of the nation versus the 
outside are developed: the process of forming an assumed national community, 
with rigid and exclusive boundaries, implies the process of defining who is and is not a 
member of that community17.  Newman states: other national groups are, at the best, 
perceived as alien residents or second-class citizens18.  Through national consciousness 
of physical boundaries, collective memories of past discrimination, and exclusive 
definitions of group belonging and legitimacy, nationalism can easily lead to existential 
                                                
15 Newman (2001) 237. 
16 Newman (1999) 12-13.  
17 Weiss, Evan S. Palestinian and Israeli Nationalism: Identity Politics and Education in Jerusalem. New York: The 
American University in Cairo Press, 2004, 83.  
18 Newman (1999), 15.  
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and territorial intragroup conflict, as it has in Israel/Palestine.  Ironically, neither group 
has, historically or presently, retained exclusive control of this territory that is typically 
seen as a center of diversity. 
In this discussion of nationalism and homeland, it is clear that the homeland 
territory constitutes a central position in national identity.  In the following section, the 
development of Israeli and Palestinian nationalisms and construction of the homeland 
will be reviewed.  
The Land of Israel Nationalism 
In the late nineteenth century, Zionism as a Jewish nationalist movement was 
established.  Theodor Herzl, considered a founding father of Zionism, believed that the 
solution to the affliction of Jews,19 primarily anti-Semitism in Europe, was the creation 
of a Jewish nation-state in the historic land of Israel20.  His book, entitled Der Judenstaat 
(The Jews State), was published in 1896 proposing this idea.  This was followed by the 
first Zionist Congress, which established the official doctrine of Zionism: to create for 
the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law21.  To do this, the Zionist 
Congress decided to promote the settlement of Palestine, to strengthen the national 
consciousness of Jews globally, and to lobby governments to support the goals of 
                                                
19 Don-Yehiya, Eliezer, Zionism in Perspective, Modern Judaism 18.3 (Oct. 1998), 20 Sept 2007, 2. 
20 Bickerton, Ian J. and Carla L. Klausner. A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
Pearson Education Inc, 2002, 24. 
21 Bickerton and Klausner 24-25. 
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Zionism22.  With this declaration, Zionism became a nationalist ideology, seeking to 
establish a state, and a homeland, for the Jewish-national group.   
Jewish nationalism surfaced as a means to revitalize the sense of collective 
identity and belonging to a primordial nation that had eroded in the Jewish 
Diaspora23.   It was Herzls dream that the Jewish state, the Promised Land would 
become home to Jews from all over the world who wanted to preserve their Jewish 
identity.  His vision has been labeled political Zionism in its aims to create a physical 
state for a nation of Jews24.  Ahad HaAm, the father of cultural Zionism, promoted 
the aim of Zionism as unifying and preserving the nation of Jews for the state of Israel 
that Herzl sought to create25.  Together, the focus of Zionism became promoting unity 
and protection of the Jewish community while establishing a nation-state26. 
Eventually, both the political and cultural aspects of Zionism came to be 
accepted by the British, who at that time, had control over the land of Palestine.  In 
1917, the Balfour Declaration was issued, attesting to the support of the British 
government for the Zionist enterprise27.  This was followed by a period of mass 
                                                
22 Bickerton and Klausner 25. 
23 Hammack, Phillip L. Identity, Conflict, and Coexistence: Life Stories of Israeli and Palestinian Adolescents. 
Journal of Adolescent Research 9.4 (July 2006),15 Aug 2007, 331. 
 
24 Finkelstein, Norman G. Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict (New York: Verso, 2001) 8.  
25 Don-Yehiya 1. 
26 Hammack 331.  
27 Shapira, Anita. Zionism in the Age of Revolution. Modern Judaism 18.3 (Oct. 1998), 217-226. 23 June 2007, 3.  
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European Jewish immigration to the land of Palestine and the subsequent tension with 
the native Palestinians28. 
In this brief history of Zionism as a nationalist movement, several aspects of 
nation building are apparent.  First, the founders of Zionism established a need for 
nationalism in order to protect the global Jewish community from anti-Semitism, 
assimilation, and other threats to the existence of the Jewish nation.  After the Nazi 
Holocaust, the fear of extinction became an even stronger component of memory of 
Jewish history: according to this collective memory, throughout the centuries, Jews 
were exposed to continuous threats from the Greek and Roman erasup to the present 
time29.  This history formed the basis of Zionist claims of the necessity of a Jewish 
homeland, and was reinforced in the late 1940s, while the UN Partition Plan was under 
contemplation.  Jews in Palestine who had lived in relative peace with the Christian and 
Muslim Palestinians began to encounter outspoken resistance to their national project 
and the establishment of the state of Israel from Palestinian and Arab opposition.  This 
created another layer in the state of existential fear in the newly founded Israeli-Zionist 
collective memory30.   The horror of the Holocaust intensified the fears of the Jewish 
community and made the prospect of Jewish annihilation seem probable.  
                                                
28 Khalidi, Rashid, Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1997) 114.  
29 Bar-Tal (2001) 611. 
30 Bar-Tal (2001), 611. 
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A second aspect of Zionist nation building is found in the promotion of the 
Jewish connection to the land of Israel.  The roots of Jewish nationalism and claims to 
the Promised Land of Israel were established as leading back to Biblical times.  Once 
Israel was established as a state, its Declaration of Independence clearly reflects the 
territorial focus of Jewish nationalism: 
The Land of Israel was the birthplace of the Jewish people. Here its 
spiritual, religious and political identity was shapedAfter being forcibly 
exiled from their land, the people kept faith with it throughout their 
Diaspora and never ceased to pray and hope for their return.  By virtue of 
our natural and historic right we hereby declare the establishment of a 
Jewish state in the Land of Israel31. 
The natural and historic claims to the land grounds Zionist nationalism to the 
religious and historical Land of Israel, thereby establishing it as a homeland for the 
Jewish people.  The concept of an ancient, promised, Jewish homeland was 
strengthened as part of the national project by a process of territorial socialization32.  
With the realization of the Zionist goal of the establishment of the Jewish state of Israel, 
this emotional concept of the homeland became political reality in May, 1948.   
 These two major factors of Zionist nation-building lay the foundations for 
exclusion of the other, the symbols of statehood were uniquely Jewish and Zionist, 
                                                
31 Preamble to the Declaration of Independence, State of Israel, May 1948 
32 Newman (1999) 14.  
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while notions of territorial attachment and spatial exclusivity were an important part of 
the educational and socialization process promoted by the State33.  In a detailed study 
of Palestinian and Israeli education systems and the role that education plays in 
national identity, Evan Weiss concludes that:   
Israel teaches its children that they are part of a primordial national 
community, the Jews, with a historic homeland and a historic language. 
Outside of that homeland, they were an unwanted minoritythe only 
solution to these problems was to find redemption in their homeland and 
build a state of their own, a state that protects them from persecution.  
But Israeli children learn that in building that state, they encountered an 
unpredictable and irrational enemy, the Arabs34 
By claiming the oldest historical presence in the land, some Zionists reject any 
other claims to the space.  Establishing control of a contested land entails denying other 
claims to the land: the Others history, place and political aspirations are presented as a 
menacing package to be thoroughly rejected35.  Therefore, Zionism developed as 
ethno-religious nationalism with an exclusive territorial claim: Zionist space was to be 
pure, attempting to maximize both Jewish control and exclusivity36. 
 
                                                
33 Newman, David. Citizenship, Identity and Location: the Changing Discourse of Israeli Geopolitics, Geopolitical 
Traditions 2000, 6.  
34 Weiss, 82. 
35 Yiftachel 227. 
36 Yiftachel 224.  
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Palestine Homeland Nationalism 
The history of Palestinian nationalism follows closely the global rise of nation 
building after World War I.  With the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the area that had been 
known as the historical land of Palestine came to be officially defined and demarcated 
as Palestine by the British, who had gained mandate control of the land37.  A collective 
consciousness began to form within the community of Arabs of Palestine, following a 
trend of Arab nationalism and motivated by a shared local culture38.   The formation of 
Palestinian nationalism was also influenced by the administrative control of the British.  
This was perceived as a form of colonialism, and did much to cement a sense of 
community and belonging, and to spur patriotic feelings regarding Palestine39.  
Further, the borders of Palestine, as set by the British Mandate, became the boundaries 
imagined by many in the Palestinian national community as the homeland of 
Palestine40.  
Palestinian nationalism developed with a strong sense of territorial belonging.  
Land held an important place in this culture; land was the basis of Palestines 
agricultural society, and this territorial attachment was supported by religious beliefs 
and local community consciousness41.  For many Palestinians, the land is filled with 
                                                
37 Khalidi, 149.  
38 Yiftachel, 224.  
39 Khalidi, 152. 
40 Falah and Newman, 692.  
41 Khalidi, 152-153.  
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sites, locations and myths that form an integral part of national identity formation42.  
Rashid Khalidi, in his well-known book on Palestinian nationalism, details the 
foundations of Palestinian local consciousness.  In a tradition he labels as urban 
patriotism, it is common that Palestinians have an awareness and pride in their 
familys cities and hometowns, which is evidenced by the use of city names as family 
names.  Also, Palestinians developed similar attachments to their villages, including 
pride in the village as special and better than others.  Both trends are still found in 
Palestinian communities, even those living outside the territory.  This is evidenced by 
how people can be easily identified as to their place of origin by their family name43.  
A broader territorial consciousness also influenced the construction of a 
Palestinian identity.  Palestine came to be defined as a member of the Arab region, and 
Palestinians recognized themselves as belonging to the Arab community.   Thus, when 
the leaders of the Palestinian national project conceptualized a Palestinian state, it was 
self-defined as an exclusively Arab state44.  By the mid-twentieth century, a 
Palestinian national consciousness had developed, creating a collective identity that was 
characterized by a local, familial, and religious connection to the homeland, which was 
then rooted in a greater Arab community.  
A devastating yet defining component of Palestinian national awareness came 
with the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948.  This event is recognized as Al 
                                                
42 Newman (1999), 12.  
43 Khalidi, 153.  
44 Falah and Newman, 701.  
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Nakba, or The Catastrophe by Palestinians, and has come to represent the loss of 
the homeland, the disintegration of society, the frustration of national aspirations, and 
the [] destruction of their culture45.  This collective trauma framed the development 
of a Palestinian national identity, and has since remained a central component of 
Palestinian collective narratives.  In particular, three consequences of Al Nakba 
continue to influence Palestinian identity: loss of the homeland, the state of exile and 
dispersion, and the struggle to return to the homeland46.   
The loss of physical control of the land for Palestinians resulted in more than just 
loss of territorial authority.  For many, Al Nakba has come to represent the denial of 
Palestinian existence and identity.  The others who gained control transformed the 
landscape of Palestine, changing Arabic names of places to Hebrew or European names. 
Hundreds of villages were destroyed during the course of the War of 1948, and the 
Palestinian population was replaced by new Israeli residents47.  Popular rhetoric in the 
early years of the State of Israel denied the existence of a people who lived in Palestine 
before the establishment of the State, and further refused to use the word Palestinian.  
The existential dilemma presented to the Palestinian nation after 1948 was 
complicated by the dispersion of the majority of the Palestinian population from their 
original homes.  The society that had once retained a deep sense of belonging to a local 
                                                
45 Sadi, Ahmad H, Catastrophe, Memory and Identity: Al-Nakbah as a Component of Palestinian Identity, Israel 
Studies 7.2 (2002), 175. 
46 Yiftachel, 230.  
47 Sadi 184-185.  
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and broader community now faced the division of cities, villages, and families and their 
resettlement in other countries.  Consequently, in the Palestinian national 
consciousness, Al Nakba represents the moment when the Palestinian people became 
homeless; after which they could never feel at home.  These Palestinians have been 
deprived of everything home signifies and providesthe place of intimacy, closeness, 
privacy, warmth, informality, and happiness48.  A sense of exile from the physical land 
and from the emotional homeland has become a prominent characteristic of the 
Palestinian ethos after 1948.  
The event of Al Nakba is what author Ahmad Sadi, in a study of Palestinian 
identity, calls: a site of Palestinian collective memory; it connects all Palestinians to a 
specific point in time that has become for them an eternal past49.  The history of 
Palestine before 1948 has become a focus of the Palestinian national narrative; and the 
attempt to affirm and recreate that history is part of the Palestinian efforts for national 
return.   An excerpt from the text of the Palestinian Declaration of Independence, a 
document written for the symbolic establishment of a Palestinian state by the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization reflects this connection to the past and future 
homeland: 
Palestine is where the Palestinian Arab people was born, on which it 
grew, developed and excelledIn Palestine and in exile, the Palestinian 
                                                
48 Sadi 181.  
49 Sadi, 177.  
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Arab people never faltered and never abandoned its conviction in its 
rights of Return and independence and the right of sovereignty over 
territory and homeland50 
Within this context, the emotional dimensions of homeland are apparent.  The 
homeland for Palestinians is a place where their present of dispossession, exile, 
oppression and unrecognized national aspirations are forgotten.  It is a Palestinian 
space, one where existential worries and national hardships are absent. It is a place 
rooted in the religious, cultural, social and local connection to the land; a place that has 
never occurred, but tied to a concrete collective past and grounded in a distinct 
territory.  This connection to a past and a national homeland is a socially constructed 
process, in part promoted by the political leadership of Palestinians living in the 
Occupied Territories.  Evan Weiss summarizes the efforts made in the Palestinian 
education system to teach children this national narrative:  
Palestinian children learn that they have a common cultural heritage in 
which they should take pride and that they have a homeland from which 
they derive their livelihood. However, it is also inculcated in them that 
they have common struggles against a common enemythe Jews.51 
 Thus, Palestinian nationalism has developed from a local cultural consciousness 
to a national movement that claims a natural belonging to the land and seeks to gain 
                                                
50 Palestinian Declaration of Independence, 15 Nov 1988, as cited in Yiftachel 216. 
51 Weiss, 82. 
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political control and control of a constructed and emotionally charged homeland.  The 
return to the physical land of Palestine and the connection to a homeland space have 
resulted in a national narrative that promotes the exclusion and denial of the other 
from the territory of Israel/Palestine. 
Exclusive Homeland Identity 
With this discussion of Palestinian and Israeli national identities, it is clear that 
the concept of homeland has been constructed and developed as an emotional space 
that is central to belonging and collective identity.  Also significant is how homeland 
has been linked to movements for political control over the territory. This dual 
understanding of homeland creates a problem of control and exclusion.  Not only do 
both Israeli and Palestinian communities often assert their national narratives as the 
sole legitimate claim of the history and culture of the land, but both also struggle to 
obtain control over the territory identified as the national homeland-state.  In this way, 
Palestinians and Israelis have developed a definition of their homeland, emotionally 
and politically, as exclusively belonging to their group52.  
Protection of this exclusive possession of the emotional-homeland-territory has 
led to attempts of delegitimizing the others national narrative. The effort from both 
sides to refute the others identity remains a powerful feature of the conflict, 
reflecting the extent to which the national identity of the other continues to be 
                                                
52 Newman (2001), 240. 
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problematic to each side because it casts doubts on its own claims53.  This relationship 
between Israeli and Palestinian identities is sometimes described as a negative 
interdependence or zero-sum: each perceives the very existence of the otherthe 
others status as a nationto be a threat to its own existence and status as a nation.  
Each holds the view that only one can be a nation: Either we are a nation or they are54.   
Negative interdependence is identified as a psychological core of the conflict, 
affecting the perception of the other in regards to their identity and their territorial 
claims55.  In terms of political control, negative interdependence requires systematic 
efforts to delegitimize and exclude the other in order to reduce the power that the 
other gains. Regarding the conception of emotional-homeland, negative 
interdependence leads to denying the others historical and cultural identification 
with the land, which undermines the total role of the homeland and results in a process 
of asserting exclusive legitimacy.  
The duality of the emotional-homeland-territory and the resulting exclusion has 
promoted the continuation of the often violent Israel/Palestine conflict.  However, the 
exclusion that has developed as a part of Israeli and Palestinian national identities is not 
an intrinsic component of identity.  The tension between ingroups and their respective 
outgroups or other-groups is not a necessary component of identity construction or 
                                                
53 Kelman, Herbert C. The Political Psychology of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: How Can We Overcome the 
Barriers to a Negotiated Solution? Political Psychology 8.3 (1987), 355.  
54  Kelman, (1999), 588. 
55 Kelman (1987), 354.  
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structure. In a review of literature concerning ingroup and outgroup negative 
reciprocity, Marilynn Brewer proposes that while the zero-sum perspective may be 
applicable in certain situations, it should not be assumed as inevitable.  She defines the 
ingroup-outgroup connection as the product of opposing needs for inclusion 
(assimilation) and differentiation from othersequilibrium is achieved through 
identification with distinctive social groups that meet both needs simultaneously.  This 
explanation of the relationship between the groups carries no implicit link between 
ingroup formation and intergroup hostility or conflict56.   
Palestinians and Israelis have constructed an emotional notion of homeland and 
tied it to political control of a territory.  This identity structure leads to exclusion of the 
otherfrom the physical territory and also by denying the others claim to a 
cultural homeland.  While this is currently the condition, the relationship between 
Israelis and Palestinians does not necessarily lead to negative-interdependence and 
identity exclusion. Rather, it is a consequence of the duality of homeland as a national 
state and an emotional space.  With the recognition that hostility between the groups is 
not inherent on a psychological level comes the implication that negative-
interdependence and exclusion can be overcome.  What is necessary is a change within 
each community that will redefine aspects of national identity in order for the practice 
of exclusion to cease.  
                                                
56 Brewer, Marilynn B, The Many Faces of Social Identity: Implications for Political Psychology, Political 
Psychology 22.1 (Mar. 2001), 434.  
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Redefining the National Homeland 
Any lasting method of conflict resolution and reconciliation developed in 
Israel/Palestine will need to reduce elements that fuel the continuation of conflict, such 
as exclusion, while recognizing essential components of Palestinian and Israeli identity, 
such as homeland.  The homeland has been established as a critical component of 
collective national identity, held sacred by Palestinians and Israelis alike.  It is a 
constructed concept that fulfills psychological needs of a group by providing a sense of 
collective community, attachment, identity and security.  As such, protecting the 
emotional, identity dimension of the homeland is essential. Given the history of how 
each group constructed and established the concept of homeland, perhaps altering the 
dual perception of homeland is one of the necessary changes needed for conflict 
reconciliation to occur.   
While both Palestinian and Israeli homelands have ties to the same territory, the 
constructed nature of homeland and the role it plays in collective identity leads to the 
conclusion that national attachment to the homeland does not necessitate political 
control of that land.  Homeland can be constructed as an emotional space that is not 
bound to exclusive control of a specific territory.  As such, the homeland would serve as 
a foundation for social interaction with the national group, would help affirm and 
secure national identity, and would still be attached to time, place and history.  
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However, as an emotional space and not a concrete, bound, political territory or 
state, the homeland would thereby be inclusive for a national group without entailing 
exclusion of another community.  This imagined space of the national community 
would still retain connection to the land; for example, Israelis could maintain national 
significance in religious sites in Judea and Samaria, while Palestinians retell the 
importance of olive groves in their national narrative of the same space. The essential 
difference of this emotional-space construction of a homeland would be divorcing the 
concept of homeland from state and exclusionary political control.   
By re-conceptualizing the homeland to be a national space encompassing all that 
is important for the identity of the nation, rather than grounding the concept of 
homeland in necessary political control, both Palestinians and Israelis will have taken 
steps to promote genuine reconciliation.  If each national group creates a homeland 
space to satisfy their groups need for a basis of national community and identity, then 
this fulfills the psychological need for a homeland while expanding political resolution 
potential and reducing contested elements of conflict. As a space rather than a bound, 
controlled territory, it is possible for homelands to overlap and even share the same 
physical place in their national narratives without leading to a contest for control.  This 
will encourage the rejection of the exclusive claims of territory.  Homeland re-
conceptualized as a national space rather than a territory allows for citizens of the 
political state to live jointly while identifying with different national narratives of 
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homeland.  This is a reflection of the concept of identity transcendencecreating a 
superordinate identity that does not conflict with national identities but rather 
supplements identities.     
 Conceptually, if the homeland is no longer understood by the national groups as 
exclusively territorial, Palestinians and Israelis will be one step closer to recognizing the 
legitimacy of the others claim to the land.  Adjusting perceptions of homeland and 
territorial attachment can lead to shared places and spaces, with neither claiming 
exclusive territorial control over all, or part, of the area 57.    These inclusive conceptions 
of space would encourage a new relationship between Israelis and Palestinians.  If 
large-scale shifts of collective identity are necessary before a conflict resolution can 
occur58, redefining the national homeland can play a role in accelerating the 
development of a transcendent identity by reducing the negative interdependence of 
the parties59.  Kelman (1999) states, A long-term resolution of the conflict requires 
development of a transcendent identity for the two peoples that does not threaten the 
particularistic identity of each60. While political policy proposals are outside of the 
scope of this paper, the creation of a superordinate, encompassing identity for Israelis 
and Palestinians typically implies the recognition of a one-state solution.   The 
redefinition of homeland offers the potential for such a transcendent identity to be 
                                                
57 Kelman (2001), 241.  
58 Hammack, 348.  
59 Kelman (1999), 581.  
60 Kelman (1999), 581. 
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bornby allowing for the attachment of a national homeland that is removed from 
control of territory, Palestinians and Israelis will have the foundation to build a new 
collective identity that recognizes and respects their differences while encouraging the 
growth of common aspects of identity.   
Conclusion 
 Homeland is an essential component of collective national identityit allows the 
consolidation of a common history, and it invokes feelings of belonging and existential 
security.  In Palestine-Israel, however, concepts of homeland have been constructed as 
connected to physical control of the territory, thus denying the others notion of 
homeland and excluding the other from the territory.  This exclusion is typical in 
similar situations of violent, existential conflicts; however, exclusion is not necessary.  
Ingroup-outgroup relations allow for identity distinction, but do not require hostility.  
The definition of homeland as a territory to control and as an emotional space promotes 
hostility creating a situation that requires the exclusion of the other for any national 
gains.  Redefinition of the homeland as a national space, removed from territorial 
control, protects national identity while reducing elements of exclusion.  This would 
allow for a new relationship to develop between Palestinians and Israelis.  In terms of 
conflict resolution, redefining the homeland could spur necessary shifts in collective 
identity by realizing that accepting the others legitimate claim to the land does not 
diminish ones own roots.    
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